FOI 2758978 - Horus Security Consultancy Ltd

Your Request

Please provide the following information:
Information
1. Yes or no - has your force shared intelligence with Horus Security Consultancy Ltd since February 2022?
2. If the answer Q1 is yes, has this included intelligence about:
a. Protest activity
b. Student protest activity
3.Yes or no - has your force received intelligence from Horus Security Consultancy Ltd since February 2022?
4. If the answer to Q3 is yes, has this included intelligence about:
a. Protest activity
b.Student protest activity
5.How much money have you paid Horus Security Consultancy Limited since February 2022, broken down by what services were paid for (e.g. insight intelligence services, DBS checks)?
6.Copies of of any contracts you hold with Horus Security Consultancy Limited
7.Copies of any Information Sharing Agreements and Data Protection Impact Assessment you hold with Horus Security Consultancy Limited

Freedom of Information Act 2000

This request is being handled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000.
Durham Constabulary neither confirms nor denies whether it holds information falling within the scope of your request. The duty under section 1(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 does not arise by virtue of section 31(3), read with sections
31(1)(a) and (b).
Confirming or denying whether Durham Constabulary holds information within the scope of your request would, in itself, reveal whether the Force has, or has had, a relationship with the named third-party organisation involving the sharing or receipt of intelligence. The request also seeks associated contracts, payments, information sharing agreements and data protection impact assessments. Confirming that any such information is held would disclose the existence of the underlying relationship, while
denying that it is held would disclose its absence.

The existence or absence of an intelligence-sharing relationship with a particular external organisation would reveal information about Durham Constabulary's intelligence capabilities, operational relationships and methods of obtaining, developing and sharing information. This could allow individuals to identify, or make informed assessments about, sources and channels available to the Force and to adapt their behaviour accordingly. The resulting loss of operational advantage would be likely to prejudice the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders.

This risk is increased by the mosaic effect. A response from Durham Constabulary could be compared with responses from other police forces and with information already in the public domain. Taken together, those disclosures could reveal patterns, gaps and differences in policing intelligence arrangements and permit conclusions to be drawn about the organisations with which forces do, or do not, work. That insight could assist individuals seeking to avoid detection or frustrate law-enforcement activity and would therefore be likely to prejudice the interests protected by sections 31(1)(a) and (b).

Public Interest Test

Factors favouring confirmation or denial - There is a public interest in transparency and accountability concerning relationships between police forces and external organisations. Confirmation or denial could assist public understanding of how policing obtains and shares information and support informed debate about intelligence handling, governance arrangements and the use of public funds.
There is also a public interest in providing reassurance that appropriate safeguards, oversight and governance arrangements are in place where police forces engage with external organisations in connection with intelligence and information sharing.

Factors favouring maintenance of the exclusion from the duty to confirm or deny - There is a substantial public interest in protecting the ability of policing to prevent and detect crime and to apprehend or prosecute offenders. Confirmation or denial would
reveal information about Durham Constabulary's intelligence-sharing arrangements and operational relationships with a named third party.
The request is directed towards establishing whether Durham Constabulary maintains such a relationship. An answer either way would provide a reference point from which an informed person could assess the Force's access to particular sources, services or
intelligence channels. That assessment could be used to alter offending behaviour, exploit perceived gaps or avoid investigative attention, creating a real and significant likelihood of prejudice to the law-enforcement interests in sections 31(1)(a) and (b).

The same reasoning applies to each category specified in the request. Confirming or denying whether contracts, payments, information-sharing agreements or data protection impact assessments are held would indicate whether Durham Constabulary
has, or has had, an arrangement with the named organisation. Even a response that no information is held in one of those categories could narrow the possible nature of any relationship and contribute to the wider mosaic. Addressing those categories separately would therefore risk disclosing the very information that the neither confirm nor deny position is intended to protect.

There is a strong public interest in ensuring that policing intelligence capabilities, operational relationships and information-sharing arrangements remain effective and are not undermined by disclosures that would be likely to prejudice law enforcement.

Balance Test

Durham Constabulary recognises the public interest in openness, transparency and accountability concerning relationships with external organisations. However, in this case greater weight must be given to protecting the Force's intelligence capabilities and
law-enforcement functions. Confirmation or denial would reveal information about an operational relationship with a named third party and, particularly when combined with information from other forces or public sources, would enable informed conclusions to
be drawn about policing intelligence activity and capability.

The likely prejudice to the prevention or detection of crime and the apprehension or prosecution of offenders outweighs the public interest in confirmation or denial. The balance of the public interest therefore favours maintaining the exclusion from the duty
to confirm or deny under section 31(3), by virtue of sections 31(1)(a) and (b), of theo Freedom of Information Act 2000.